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	<title>Comments on: Security Approaches That Don&#8217;t Work</title>
	<atom:link href="http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/</link>
	<description>Patterns and Practices for Software Success.</description>
	<pubDate>Fri, 10 Sep 2010 12:38:40 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Invalid Argument &#187; Shaping Software » Security Approaches That Don’t Work</title>
		<link>http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/comment-page-1/#comment-26648</link>
		<dc:creator>Invalid Argument &#187; Shaping Software » Security Approaches That Don’t Work</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Jan 2009 14:24:32 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>[...] Shaping Software » Blog Archive » Security Approaches That Don’t Work. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Shaping Software » Blog Archive » Security Approaches That Don’t Work. [...]</p>
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		<title>By: JD</title>
		<link>http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/comment-page-1/#comment-25591</link>
		<dc:creator>JD</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 11 Jan 2009 17:16:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/#comment-25591</guid>
		<description>@ Anil

Cross-group criteria is tough.  I've seen it work in two scenarios:
1.  Somebody from the other group joins the team as a partner
2.  The criteria is turned into a set of incremental hurdles, and again, there's a partnership

@ Mike

Thank you.  I like the fact it resonates with your experience.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@ Anil</p>
<p>Cross-group criteria is tough.  I&#8217;ve seen it work in two scenarios:<br />
1.  Somebody from the other group joins the team as a partner<br />
2.  The criteria is turned into a set of incremental hurdles, and again, there&#8217;s a partnership</p>
<p>@ Mike</p>
<p>Thank you.  I like the fact it resonates with your experience.</p>
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		<title>By: Mike de Libero</title>
		<link>http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/comment-page-1/#comment-25411</link>
		<dc:creator>Mike de Libero</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 10 Jan 2009 22:26:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/#comment-25411</guid>
		<description>Great article JD.  That article pretty much sums up most of the security anti-patterns that come up these days.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Great article JD.  That article pretty much sums up most of the security anti-patterns that come up these days.</p>
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		<title>By: Anil John</title>
		<link>http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/comment-page-1/#comment-25338</link>
		<dc:creator>Anil John</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 10 Jan 2009 14:26:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/#comment-25338</guid>
		<description>Very Nice.

I've also seen approaches where dev and security are done by different orgs and there is an attempt to force-fit them as part of a certification and accreditation phase that the system/software needs to go through to be in production.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Very Nice.</p>
<p>I&#8217;ve also seen approaches where dev and security are done by different orgs and there is an attempt to force-fit them as part of a certification and accreditation phase that the system/software needs to go through to be in production.</p>
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		<title>By: JD</title>
		<link>http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/comment-page-1/#comment-25247</link>
		<dc:creator>JD</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 10 Jan 2009 03:36:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/#comment-25247</guid>
		<description>@ Alik

10,000 ways that won't work ;)

Thank you

@ Kevin

Thank you!  I think it's easier to relate to the approaches when we have simple metaphors or names for them.  You're right, no security is the most common approach!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@ Alik</p>
<p>10,000 ways that won&#8217;t work <img src='http://shapingsoftware.com/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_wink.gif' alt=';)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
<p>Thank you</p>
<p>@ Kevin</p>
<p>Thank you!  I think it&#8217;s easier to relate to the approaches when we have simple metaphors or names for them.  You&#8217;re right, no security is the most common approach!</p>
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		<title>By: Kevin Lam (IMPACTA)</title>
		<link>http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/comment-page-1/#comment-25235</link>
		<dc:creator>Kevin Lam (IMPACTA)</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 10 Jan 2009 02:07:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/#comment-25235</guid>
		<description>This is a really nice write-up! Forget nice, I think it's great.  Your sum up of the bolt-on approach, which is the second most common approach today (next to no security ;P) is elegant: Make it work, and then make it right.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is a really nice write-up! Forget nice, I think it&#8217;s great.  Your sum up of the bolt-on approach, which is the second most common approach today (next to no security ;P) is elegant: Make it work, and then make it right.</p>
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		<title>By: Alik Levin</title>
		<link>http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/comment-page-1/#comment-25121</link>
		<dc:creator>Alik Levin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Jan 2009 09:12:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://shapingsoftware.com/2009/01/09/security-approaches-that-dont-work/#comment-25121</guid>
		<description>That is great write up.
In the field I see more approaches that do not work than do work.
But I also like Edison's "I have not failed. I’ve just found 10,000 ways that won’t work."

You distilled precisly anti-patterns so it is easy to identify and avoid it.

Here is my take on the security reviews that worked for me:
http://tinyurl.com/9zvb92</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That is great write up.<br />
In the field I see more approaches that do not work than do work.<br />
But I also like Edison&#8217;s &#8220;I have not failed. I’ve just found 10,000 ways that won’t work.&#8221;</p>
<p>You distilled precisly anti-patterns so it is easy to identify and avoid it.</p>
<p>Here is my take on the security reviews that worked for me:<br />
<a href="http://tinyurl.com/9zvb92" rel="nofollow">http://tinyurl.com/9zvb92</a></p>
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